tv Discussion Examines Lone Wolf Terrorism Threat CSPAN August 1, 2017 12:21am-1:55am EDT
news and policy issues that impact you. tuesday morning, sasha booker, staff attorney for lambda legal and a transgender marine veteran, discusses the proposed transgender van -- ban. >> then joshua green will talk about his book on steve bannon and his relationship with president trump. and george washington university law professor jonathan turley updates on the investigation of the trump white house and russia. be sure to watch "washington journal," live at 7:00 a.m. eastern tuesday morning. during the discussion. announcer: now a look at the threat of lone wolf terrorism. panelists include an israeli counterterrorism official, along with the director for security studies at georgetown university. they will talk about the motivations and tactics of lone wolf terrorists, and the challenges facing law enforcement officials. from the washington institute of near east policy. they hosted this event.
>> good afternoon everybody. good afternoon and welcome to the washington institute for near east policy, and to the latest program on counterterrorism and intelligence lecture series. it is my pleasure to have on our podium today boaz ganor, bruce altman from georgetown university, marlene mazell, on leave from israel, an adjunct scholar here at the washington institute, and i am matthew levitt, director of the counterterrorism program here at the washington institute. thank you for coming, those of you for a hearing person, and for joining us, those of you who are watching in c-span land. terrorist acts conducted by individuals acting on their own, inspired by others, completely alone, not so much alone, it is not a new phenomenon.
but in the past few years, we've seen an alarming increase. number ofe in the what some have described as lone wolves, lone actors, or loan offenders. the islamic state has certainly been very proactive in using its global social media presence in particular to conscript individuals, some who have personal problems, others who are inspired by belonging to a higher cause, to carry out attacks in its name, especially if they are unable to join the islamic state and its so-called caliphate, when that existed. it is now falling apart in iraq and syria. but meanwhile, in other parts of the world, and israel in particular, we are seeing a sharp rise as well of individuals taking it upon themselves to carry out acts of violence, without having been recruited by or trained by or armed or funded by an actual group. and so the question for today's session is whether this is a
looming threat, or a passing fad. so i am very pleased to have three good friends on the panel today. ganor is the dean at the ict counterterrorism center, the lauder school of government and diplomacy at the interdisciplinary center university in herzliya, israel. bruce hoffman is the director of both the center for security studies and the security studies program at georgetown university's edmund walsh school of foreign service. is lambdae mazell adjunct scholar from the washington institute, here on leave from her position as director of counterterrorism at the israeli ministry of justice. marlene is a good friend. i sit on the board for boaz's counterterrorism institute in israel.
and i teach, starting this coming semester, in bruce's program at georgetown. this really is a lot of fun for me. as it happens, i happen to have some expertise on the matter. so with no further it do, we will start with boaz, then go to bruce, then marlene. i will bat cleanup. then i will moderate from the table, q&a sessions until we end at 2:00. boaz gainor, please. and i will lead by example -- please do shut off or silence your phones. thank you very much. >> thank you very much, matt. it is a real pleasure and honor to be here at the washington institute, and in this distinguished panel with you. i have to say that matt gave me and the rest of the panel only 10 minutes. mytakes me more to start engines, but i will do the impossible and try to squeeze my thoughts into the 10 minutes of the session. i would like to open with trying to allocate where the
phenomenon of the lone wolf stems among the overall different types of terrorist attacks altogether, so let me start by classification. i will start by classifying different perpetrators of terrorism. the first type is the one we are discussing about today. i call this the personal initiative attack. it is more known under the title of the lone wolf attacker. who is the lone wolf? the lone wolf is lambda individual that has been radicalized by this or the other source, and one day after being radicalized, he decides he wants to do something about it. he has two options. one option is actually to join a terrorist organization, maybe fly as a fighter to syria or iraq. the other option is to become a homegrown terrorist and to conduct a terrorist attack in the territory that he is living in. this is the lone wolf attacker. the lone wolf
attacker has been inspired by a terrorist organization. and many scholars today question the fact that he is a "lone wolf" attacker altogether, because almost always, there is some connection to a terrorist organization. or at least, inspiration which has been done by a terrorism organization. i would use the term lone wolf, because the lone wolf, being inspired by a terrorist organizations, doesn't have any operational ties with the terrorist organization. meaning that the terrorist organization is not necessarily involved in the initiation, planning, preparation and execution of the attack altogether. the second type of perpetrators, is what i call be independent network. the independent networks, practically is a bunch o lone bang -- of lone wolf lone wolves. this group, usually a small
group of 4, 5, people together, usually friends or family members in some cases, for example the san bernardino husband and wife, an independent network. why? a group of lone wolves? because, it is an inspiration attacks, not without the operational involvement of a terrorist organization. by the way, if you were to ask them before the attacks, they would refer to themselves as activists of isis or al qaeda or whoever and after the attack the , terrorist organization would responsibilityke most probably for what they do but since they do not have any , operational ties with the organization, only being inspired. the third type of a terrorist attacks, is what i call the organized terrorism. isis, sleeper cells, infiltrated cells, a different ballgame altogether. here, we're talking about a group, a cell, it could even include individual in some cases
that has been recruited, trained, and the terrorist organization is involved in all of the operational background and activities which launched the attack the red have good news and bad news. and i compared the lone wolf attack to organized terrorism. usually lone wolf attacks are not that different. the number of casualties is quite limited. of course, there are exceptions such as nice. but in most cases, how many people can be hurt in a lone wolf attack? most of them, the majority of the attacks, are using cold weapons. either a knife guns, or running , people down. in some cases the use light weapons, but seldom use explosive devices. but when talking about this phenomenon, it is limited to altogether, compared to organized terrorism. organized cells, such as the bataclan attack in france, or the 9/11 attacks, those are different.
the bad news, and i will explain in a minute, why i am using past tense here we used to believe , that intelligence is incapable of dealing with the phenomenon of the lone wolf. why? because traditional intelligence, human sources, and communications intelligence, is based on what? it is based on the fact that there is some kind of discourse between at least two people, who share the secret of who they are planning to attack. telling youent, that or the ability to wiretap and listen to the conversation. cases of the lone wolf, there are no conversations. everything starts and ends with the sick mind of one person. so, intelligence seems to be useless in this regard. i emphasize, seems to be, today,
we see it differently. now, going back to another classification, the classification of the terrorist attack, i would suggest, i do not have enough time to go into it, that we have two scales in one scale has to do with the the attacks, when we are trying to classify them. level of the terrorist organization in the attacks, starting with no involvement whatsoever and ending with full, organized terrorist attacks by a terrorist organization. the other scale would be the level of independence of the attacker. meaning is he really , independent, or did he share a secret with a friend, or an adult peer, or did he consult with anybody, did he have an accomplice or accomplices who gave him passive or active support, did he conduct the attack with others, like an independent network, and so on
and so forth. once we have those two scales, we can go back to the specifications we had before, and see how lone wolf terrorism, falls into that scale, and then we can judge which attacks, what type of attack was conducted. why is it important? it is not just a theoretical discussion, of course, you need to behave differently, you need to have different operational counterterrorism activities in reference to lone wolf networks and organized terrorism altogether. now let's go into the subject matter of the lone wolf read when we are talking about the lone wolf attacks, usually they conduct cold weapon attacks, stoning, bulldozing, and israel we had bulldozing, which is running down with a bulldozer and also, as i said, shootings and bombings altogether. one exception, suicide attacks, were not conducted by lone wolves.
of course, we need to define the term suicide attacks. the way that i described "suicide attacks" is that the type of person who was , threatening themselves with a suicide belt, or carrying explosive devices, and pushing the button, those attacks are usually always organized terrorism. there is always an organization behind it, planning and preparing it and executing it. usually one individual conduct s the attack but there is an organized terrorism organization behind that. when you are talking about the rationale behind that, the best answer that i can give you today, that waste on my experience and counterterrorism in which i have been in for 35 years, based on my experience, terrorists are rational actors. what does this mean? it means that terrorists in general are calculating costs and benefits and choosing their alternative, which they believe is more beneficial than costly. that is what rational people do, that is what we do every day.
but, they have a different cost-benefit calculation than we have in the western society and in other places. they have a subjective calculus of cost and benefit. a good counterterrorism expert needs to understand take out his , own considerations, his own cost-benefit calculations, and put on his head, that enemy's -- the enemy's calculations. the bad news is that there is practically no one generic terrorist calculation. the cost-benefit calculation of isis is different than that of al qaeda's, different than the one of hamas, or hezbollah. and actually, even within the organization, you can see that the considerations of isis today, are different from the concentrations that they had a year ago, and they will be different in one years time. the real values that they have is that when we're talking about lone wolf, it is much more
different to understand -- more difficult to understand the theonale, because it is rationale of an individual, not of a group. i want to show you four pictures that were taken in israel in , which the common denominator are lone wolves that have just four been arrested, after stabbing people in the streets in jerusalem and other places altogether. they're are being handcuffed, and being escorted to the police car. probably going to spend life in jail. that is a common denominator. but there is another common denominator which you will see immediately in the pictures. the other, denominator, is the smile on their faces. this is not a coincidence. you know, i just visited chinatown yesterday, in new york. and there was an arrest in front of my face, the nypd arrested a criminal there. he did not smile, he was walking to the police car, handcuffed , he did not smile.
but they are smiling because, i , would argue, this is a reflection of their calculus of cost-benefit. what they believe, is that whatever they did right now although they are going to pay a , high price, spending life in prison, probably, they did the honorable saying something , which is more beneficial than costly from their point of view. task, asur counterterrorism experts, to understand this calculus, and then develop counter messages and so on and so forth. by the way, i used the term zombies" in order to describe this concept. the first reason is that youngsters understand what zombies are. and the second, the term "zombies" doesn't have any shred of honor. i want to take this concept of honor from them. you will see, and the other example, another jihadi zombie, next to my campus in israel,
actually stabbing every person that is waiting in a public bus stop altogether. that is a jihadi zombie. it is not just in israel, this conductedi zombie who leettack in london, killing rigby, in a suburb of london and , not even running away. he was preaching to everyone who was ready to take a video clip about the reasons behind his attack. also, in the united states, there is a case of thompson in 2014, the afro-american who converted to islam and then went on to wage jihad against the nypd officers. by the way, in a nutshell, one new phenomenon that we see, is the growing threat of radicalized islamist terrorists, who are converts. the guy from manchester was a convert, and we had other cases
of converts including in israel , by the way, jews who have converted to islam. it would probably be much easier to radicalize a person who has , converted to islam. a newcomer in the religion. i said at the beginning, that we used to believe that intelligence is useless in reference to dealing with lone wolf attackers, because of the secret kept in their mind. well, we were wrong. instead of human sources, and communication sources of intelligence, we have found that we have the ability to understand, maybe even to predict what is going to happen, based on open sources of intelligence. the writing is on the wall, on the facebook wall on instagram, , you name it. what we have seen is that many of those attackers actually gave forewarning, because they like to brag about it. because, they did the honorable thing to do, and they wanted people to believe that what they
did was the honorable thing to do, and therefore they are sharing that all over the social network. this is one example of a lone wolf in israel, who said in the h, today i decided , to become a martyr. the attack in berlin, was an outcome of the understanding of the attacker, the lesson learned from the attacks that happen before, in london, and nice. after the attack, they are becoming a model of imitation, and what we see practically is a very vicious cycle. and i will conclude with this. starting with incitement, coming from the terrorist organization, moving on or being processed in the radicalization process by the individual, then they decide
to do something about it, planned the attack and before conducting the attacks, in many cases he published on a political platform, and after the attack he becomes a fertilizer for further incitement at the end of the day, this is becoming an epidemic phenomenon. the good news, is that it is transparent and practically, we can watch it, understand it and analyze it. and maybe even prevented. thank you -- maybe even prevent it. thank you very much. [applause] hoffman thank you, matt, and the : washington institute for this very kind invitation to come and speak today. and to serve on this very distinguished panel. let me focus my remarks a bit more and talk about isis or the islamic state, or isil. and start with a very broad observation.
that i think boaz would agree with me, and i think many people in the audience who i have known for many decades in the counterterrorism world, at the risk of stating the obvious, i think one of the mythologies of both the study of terrorism, and counterterrorism, is the collective amnesia, or a short memory. this is not that surprising, the tyranny, the inbox, the daily deluge of threats that one has to contend with, but one of the problems or challenges is that it often crowds out any historical perspective. so, in that respect, i would like to read you a quote, and think about who would have said this and when it would've been said. "tracking down, the americans and the jews is not impossible. killing them with a single bullet, a stab, or device, made up of a popular mix of explosives or hitting them with , an iron rod is not impossible. burning down their property with a molotov cocktail is not
difficult. with the available means small , groups could prove to be a frightening horror for the americans and the jews." any takers? anybody want to guess? it was ayman al-zawahiri, in a publication released in 2001. called "nights under the profit's banner -- the pro the currentr." leader of al qaeda today, was on the run from perhaps the greatest onslaught directed against the terrorist group in history, operation iraqi freedom. nevertheless, he wrote this statement designed to redirect al qaeda and carry on the struggle. the only problem was that it fell on deaf ears. the phenomenon of lone wolf terrorism did not materialize until a decade later with the rise of isis. then we have this statement of mohammed al-adnani from september 2014, the late deputy
commander, senior official and operational planner, propagandist, par excellence of isis. his words were almost remarkably similar, -- if you are not able to find an ied or bullet, then single out a disbelieving american, frenchmen, or any of their allies. slaughter him with a knife, run him over with your car, choke him, throw him down from a high place, or poison him. it is precisely isis's innovative revolutionary use of social media that has transformed both the nature of terrorism in a remarkably short span of time, but also empowered the group, in less than three years, it has become one of the most challenging threats that we face, and one of the most i , would argue, durable terrorist organizations. do not have that ability to be revolutionary and innovative
and then fade from the scene , because of the loss of a couple of cities. i would argue that isis is here to stay, at least, for the foreseeable future. and one of the main reasons for that, is their ability to harness and exploit social media, and harness this broad vesl rse of loan -- lone attackers. there is another point in which isis has been the norm is the innovative, which will have many consequences for us for years to come. the 9/11 model of terrorism, the 9/11 attacks, involve professional terrorist trained overseas, deployed and operating under a very clear hierarchy, command and control structure with very strict operational orders. it was the traditional model of terrorism. of course, the lone wolf model, that boaz just described, challenged law enforcement in a different way.
they have no logistical tail, no interdict them, and to predict them. fortunately, as he pointed out, their violence is limited. but nevertheless, there ability -- their ability to overwhelm, preoccupy and distract law enforcement and intelligence and security services, is enormous. and yet, what we see is that the most formidable terrorist organizations, are also the ones who are the most innovative and dynamic. unfortunately, like isis, which has now, in recent months pioneered a third form of terrorism. the bottom-up form of terrorism, different from the 9/11 model, the lone wolf, and now they have a hybrid. which i would argue, presents a new and very serious challenge for law enforcement and intelligence. this is a new hybrid of enablers, that take advantage of
lone wolves, individuals that have no prior connections to terrorist organizations that may never have met a terrorist in their life, or left their own communities to go and be trained in overseas by terrorist organizations. they are manipulated and exploded, ultimately inspired and animated to commit terrorist violence on behalf of terrorist organizations. the new twist now, is that the se terrorist organizations are providing these individuals with various assessments often very , detailed intelligence and instructions. thus empowering them, and making the lone wolf more of a threat than they have been today. this new emergence of the challenge was brought home last march, when isis released a hit list, a targeting list of some 8000 names of americans from around the country. when i attempted to print it out immediately, it wasn't
formatted well, but it ran for about 25 pages, and had names of individuals, their home and work addresses, people who lived in the metropolitan d.c. area, will recognize some of the addresses, of these suburban facilities of u.s. intelligence agencies. it had email addresses, sometimes mobile phone numbers, in other words, this was a hit list, a target list. isis at least, meant to stir some amount of psychological discord and create alarm and anxiety, which is always the object of terrorism, but also enhance the power of the lone wolf. so consequently, isis has changed the nature of terrorism in a very short span of time. which i think means that it will not going to disappear or fade from the scene, anytime soon. the fundamental challenges facing law enforcement, intelligence agencies and security services today, not just in the united states, but i
would argue around the world, is not to be overwhelmed by the threat of lone wolves. not to be deluded into focusing exclusively on anyone threat, -- any one not to be distracted threat not to be distracted by , the low hanging fruit of comparably unprofessional lone wolves but to focus on the entire spectrum of terrorist threats including those coming from more professional, better organized, planned traditional forms of terrorism. i would argue that this is precisely the trap that the french fell into in 2015. the intense focus on the lone individuals, who they had to track and monitor, and the degradation to their abilities because of the focus on one , particular segment of the threat, let perhaps tragically to the lowering of their guard, and to the successful simultaneous suicide attacks
that we saw there. so, in conclusion therefore at a , time of comparatively diminishing resources, at a time, after a decade and a half plus of the war on terrorism, when political will has been reduced and when our collective governments and countries are ed what we see is the in this ongoing war multiplication of new and even , more challenging threats that means we cannot let down our guard. thank you. [applause]
marlene: hi, good afternoon, it's a pleasure to be here today. i'm speaking today as matt mentioned, i work in the ministry of justice and have the privilege of being on academic leave this summer. i am speaking today at my best in my personal capacity and what i'm looking at is a small slice of this discussion we were the lone wolf and attacks in israel committed by youths. recently, the eu came out with a terrorism report and it identified a recent trend. the trend number 10 is the youth are playing an increasingly independent operational role in committing terrorist attacks in eu countries. so, my contribution to today's
panel, is to preview the research that i started to work on in israel, and i am continuing here at the institute. it's a very small issue. when i was interested in bedying, whether it leadershipa glorify theh terrorist acts of specific youth and if they did, did that play a role in encouraging further youth to engage in further violence? so in israel this issue came up , in october of 2015. in october alone of that year, there were 59 terrorist attacks and 17 of those were committed by youths. nearly one third. in there was a raging debate october, that corrupted in the media. what was causing this new wave -- ragingrrupted debate that erupted in the media. what was causing this new wave of violent terror attacks by
youth? it was very troubling. some beautiful it as a statement by mahmoud abbas that he made on september 16. he said we welcome every drop of blood spilled in jerusalem. this is pure blood, clean blood, blood on its way to allah. his words were widely disseminated. some credited these words for inspiring the violent stabbing attacks that began two weeks later in october. others took a different view. they said no, these terrorists , including the youths were lone wolves. they were angry at the occupation, frustrated at the peace talks that broke down. one palestinian poll taken in september, 2015 said 57% of those polled supported the return to an armed intifada. another expert said it was his -- it was a conflict of both of these factors. what i was looking at and what sparked my interest was what was actually happening on the ground. how many youth were committing attacks? and i started to study the specific attacks committed. what you can see here that we
found a very troubling number, 105 attacks that were committed by youth their ages were between , 11-17. when we quantified the attacks, we quantified violent attacks, and we took out information on the molotov cocktails because we were trying to study the specific new phenomenon of stabbings with knives. so the question i was looking at what was the percentage of the , 105 of the overall attacks committed during the time. , and the statistics that i tond so far is between .25 .5 of all of the attacks committed. clearly, there is a dramatic increase in the stabbing by use. -- by youths. the research has tried to answer three different questions -- number one, why? why were these palestinian youths engaging in violent stabbing terror attacks question -- terror attacks?
number is there a connection two, between the fatah leadership glorifying the actions of the youths and encouraging more attacks? number three, if we find a correlation exists, can any lessons emerge about radicalization? so the data that we found thus far is that we found there were four 11 and 12-year-olds, 14 to3-year-old, 59 16-year-olds, and 29 17-year-olds. you can see on the right pie chart the vast majority of the attacks were stabbing attacks using knives. the next question we were looking at was very specific. we were looking at glorification of the acts of the youth by the palestinian authority in fatah. we were looking for public source information. we looked at arabic, english, hebrew websites, all different types of information to identify whether the pa and fatah were
taking action to glorify the youths. we took the names of all the youth and ran it through these databases to see what we could find acts of glorification. this is a very, specific study. there were things that we did not include. we did not include examples of in the studywe did not include examples of general , glorification. for example, there was a report issued by palestinian media watch, during july 2015, and they found out that education institutions were teaching hate and praising terrorists including youth who kill civilians and depict them as heroes and martyrs. as has but -- as boas was saying, they might have a different influence. the other thing that we did not include was general statements , of praise of the youths. if there were general statements fatah five to -- by the
praising the action in general those are not reflected in the , data thus far. we just reflected specific actions on specific youth that committed the attacks. to give a fuller picture, there were statements made that repudiated terrorism. the study though, wanted to focus on whether the actions were consistent with these statements. during this time, there was also significant security cooperation between the pa and israel which was very, very important, and very helpful in supporting terrorist attacks by youth. boarding--ing -- in thwarting terrorist attacks by youth. at the same time, there were many other factors of information that was released and available to the youth by hamas and isil in social media accotsed by terrorist organizations about how to kill a jew using a knife.
so there were many aspects of information that could be influencing youths that were part of many other studies. we were looking at the very specific question of whether they were acts of the palestinian authority and fatah leadership on specific children. so this is what we found, there were in fact acts of glorification by the pa. we found over 25 acts. what kind of information were we seeing? we were seeing that they were giving terrorists official funerals, publishing official flyers to glorify the youths as martyrs. theading condolences to families. here, we have two examples of what that looks like. a terrorister of attack or. you can see that islamist emblazoned to the left and the right. and it says here with pride and and he is you a giants.
he was responsible for being involved in a stabbing attack that injured a soldier. here's another example of a military funeral that was one of of a military funeral for one of the terrorist attackers, where he was given a formal military funeral. on the bottom, you see a flyer. the statement on the bum -- the statement on the bottom reflects his name and also his through official channels. being praised the next question we were looking at, is there a correlation? we saw that there were specific acts of glorification. which was troubling. it's not what you would want to see in this context. we were looking at whether there was a correlation between the numbers of attacks glorifying the acts of the specific children and the commission of attacks or additional attacks? the preliminary results were fascinating. you will see here on top, the acts of glorification and you
can see next, the terrorist attacks by youth. what we can see so far and this -- and i repeat, this is preliminary data there seems to , be a correlation between statements of glorification and the number of terror attacks that were committed. you can see that there were many more attacks committed between october and march and it seems to be a sharp drop starting in april toward the end of september 2016. a dramatic drop in the glorification and the terrorist attacks committed by youths. i am not really sure what it means at this stage. there could have been many environmental factors that had nothing to do with the glorification, and that there may not be a correlation at all. the data i was looking at did not show causation. you could not say there was a specific statement of that causedd fatah
a specific response by the youth, that would be more complex. that would involve interviewing. there was one example in the study, a 15-year-old, when she she murdered a, 38-year-old mother of six. she explained during her questioning, that she was influenced in general by the palestinian television which had an influence. that was not an example of direct causation, one individual who felt that they were influenced by what they saw on television. we interview different expert s, shown on the chart. we asked if there was a correlation. these are some views i've heard so far that i thought it would share. some experts were of the view that it was actually the upcoming report of the middle east quartet that was going to address the issue of incitement and that led to a decrease understanding that the report , would be released. others were of the view that
palestinian society and individuals were very upset that the youths were engaging in violent attacks and numerous measures were taken by the pa and fatah including the reduction of glorification in order to actively discourage the use from these attacks. some experts thought it was the israeli counterterrorism actions. people who understand the issue said it was a combination of all of the above. in any event, it does seem interesting. it seemed interesting in terms of two factors. if you could quantify what the relevant input or influence of one form of glorification or incitement that might be helpful to counterterrorism study efforts. and bruce were
discussing it's also important , to look at the cumulative impact on a particular youth of all the different areas of incitement or influence that might be encouraging youth to act. and perhaps if you could find out what was encouraging them, you can find out how to discourage them, stop the attacks, and that might be equally helpful to the counterterrorism effort. thank you. [applause] matt: excellent, thank you all very much. i would like to go last so that when all the good stuff is taken, i can come up with a few short nuggets and open up two q -- open up to q&a. there are many of you who have sat in these chairs before and heard me speak at this podium before and i'm sure there is one or two of you who are keen to hear what i will say about the nature of lone wolf attacks, given that i have stood here in the past and said that the "lone wolf" idea is really largely a misnomer.
and i think that when i said that at this podium, including bruce, an event with back in when i wrote this in two november, different foreign policy pieces in september and march of last year, i don't think i was wrong. counterterrorism is not static. when the islamic state was still remaining and expanding, to use its own terminology, and may be even more so, when it was a little bit on its back heels and really sought to actively send returning foreign fighters back home to europe or elsewhere to direct and where it couldn't maybe just enable, as bruce discussed, terrorist attacks that may be would be carried out by lone individuals, maybe a loan attacks, maybe a loan offender, that not really a "lone wolf".
maybe not someone operating on, let's be clear, on her own. his or her own. the counterterrorism report raises concerns about the increase not only in the number of attacks over all, the number of inspired attacks overall but in particular, the number of attacks involving women is one -- women as one of these new trends. i think we can look back at the speech in september, 2014 and more recently, not long before 2016, veryed in may, specifically calling on people saying that if you cannot come here, at least do things where you are -- as examples of the way in which the islamic state proactively tried to play on the , situations in which at risk individuals, mostly youth, found themselves. then to provide people with some kind of capability. at the time, i felt that the era of the lone wolf was largely over because what we were seeing
at the time was more known wolves than lone wolves, people who are on the radar of law enforcement one way or another. they were not completely unknown and they were having some type of connective tissue to an organized group even if they weren't originally recruited by that group or armed by the group, maybe the only way you could draw the line is through further radicalization and, in some cases, the provision of some intelligence to be able to carry out the attack. what we are seeing now at a time when the caliphate is not just on its back heels but is about to be destroyed, is something a little different. we are seeing a desire on the part of the islamic state to be able to perpetuate itself as an idea beyond the existence of its caliphate as a state as such. we're also seeing several other phenomena.
on the one hand, the caliphate is about to end as such but the caliphate genie is out of the bottle. and those people wherever they , are in the west, let's say, who have grievances and are reading the online propaganda, their memory, as i think it was bruce who said will be , short-lived. one of the radicalization messages that we are sure to start seeing if it's not out there already, is that there was , a caliphate, it was not perfect, we made mistakes, but there was a caliphate and all we really wanted to do was to be left alone to live sharia compliant lives in the west - -- lives, but west would not have that, therefore it was destroyed. if we were allowed to progress, we would have become less brutal, more normal. in other words the idea that , there was recently a caliphate recently, not hundreds of years ago, but recently, a caliphate
that did exist, whether or not it was rejected by the vast majority of muslims who do not see this as a caliphate will be ghdadi as ae, nor ba caliph to these , individuals will be drawn to this message. they will be drawn by a medium that still exists, social media is able to penetrate every border into the basement of every home. people who have problems will still be drawn to these issues and i would argue that the grievances that have led people to be attracted to and have the cognitive opening for radical messages is in fact, if anything, on the rise. europeans have let in many refugees and migrants but they have not done a particularly good job of enabling them to assimilate into society. there are a lot of different ways in which this set of grievances is likely to expand. if you look the past few months, you can see groups trying to rebuild a new kind of propaganda
specifically about the lone wolves. i should stress, that as bruce noted, the idea is not new. listening at that time, but over time, people did start to listen. e-book, "howl the to survive in the west." you may recall that the bomber in new york and new jersey appears to have been inspired not by the islamic state that byanwar al -- by and work out a lucky -- -awlaki, who was radicalized in over the past few death as in life. months, the islamic state e-book was released to home school lone wolf's, as they put it. the lone wolf handbook written in turkish disseminated on telegram, in june.
nashir, related to the islamic's date, released a video, noting the attacks in melbourne etc., calling for attacks in australia, america, canada, europe, and russia. of course, there was the rumia , the ninth volume, released in with this large section called may, "just terror tactics and hostage taking" with details on how to carry out acts of ,iolence and acquire firearms and what might be the ideal types of targets for these attacks and how to execute people. what you do if you do not have a firearm, how to lure a target, for example, posting an online site that you have an apartment to rent, and then lure people to the apartment and then kill them. reallyng that is
security has had to deal with for years, and etc.. i should note that much like the case of rahimi who was l-awlaki we need to recognize that the same phenomenon might not have caught on and had momentum when it was claimed shortly after 9/11. it certainly is now. there is a competition between the remains of the islamic state and al qaeda which is causing al qaeda to pick up its game. al qaeda is very much on the rise, i believe. the washington institute just led a research and produced a volume edited by my colleagues zellen on how al qaeda has , survived the arab spring and al qaeda has also begun to reintroduce the magazine "inspire" a shorter version is very specifically on people who carry out attacks and how you can do the same.
and i think we need to, as roos said not be so caught up in one , part of the threat that we don't see the others. the al qaeda threat is very , very serious. looknk it is important to at the report that talks about the spectrum of inspired, enabled, and directed plots. when it comes to those who are inspired and loan offenders, they write that these are individual attackers possibly but not necessarily being helped by family and friends as accomplices. they are inspired by jihadist propaganda messaging but not necessarily instructions from -- not necessarily receiving instructions or direction from any particular group. i think we need to recognize that even as we have success on the battlefield against the islamic state, radicalization process is not linear. you can have someone was radicalized, maybe gets de-radicalized or disengages
from radicalism but then events can happen in that person and -- and that person can be radicalized again. when you have social media available 24/7 messages can , change and updated. people can be radicalized. i am of the opinion that so long as our- so long counterterrorism strategy in syria is only paying attention to the islamic state, and we are not paying any particular attention to al qaeda or paying any attention to a guy assad, those foreign fighters will still be there. there will still be more, even if we do dismantle the islamic state. i am drawn to a recent study on the likelihood that u.s. homegrown violent extremism will experience recidivism.
they mention many cases in the report, and we need to take this to heart. there will be recidivism, in terms of the people who overturn to radicalization. likelihood ofe still more individuals acting on their own. whatstill not a matter of -- in love with the term lone wolves . it sort of makes them out to be big and powerful and maybe even honorable. they are not really wolves at all. if they are truly lone wolves, they have broken from the pack and have no connective tissue whatsoever which i would argue would have to include inspiration and that definitely exists. the problem of lone offenders, or as the report puts it, lone attackers, is very real. while the israelis have done some really interesting and effective work in being able to mine social media postings, not everybody is posting on the
social media. and even if they are, we are not always able, especially in a country the size of the united states compared to israel, able to mine that data in a timely manner. and the biggest concern is not , just the issue of encryption when you get to the inability to follow the messages that still exist between people who are part of a group, the problem is also that people can be radicalized, people are radicalized today so quickly. it is not like -- you know, when i started my career in counterterrorism in the fbi in the 1990's, there was a lead time. bang.ash to a period of time from radicalization to mobilization can be very quick now. days or even hours. that does not leave law enforcement or intelligence a whole lot of leeway or much of a window to be able to catch on to what could happen very quickly. when you're talking about doing something as simple as picking up a knife or getting in a car or in this country, it's not difficult to get your hands on a
handgun. when we're talking about the very strong likelihood, that as we move forward, as the islamic state continues to crumble, what i said last year will no longer be true. it will not only be true. that is to say it will still be , the case that we will have enabled and even directed plots directedar term, those plots are likely to increase, and as the islamic state collapses. the report specifically says that there is data intelligence and concern of the islamic state now trying to infiltrate trained operatives to the west to be , able to do things right now as things are collapsing at home. moving beyond that or parallel to that at the same time, the likelihood that individuals will try and carry things out on their own, i think, increases. that means the nature of the threat will be more than just isis or al qaeda.
it will not only be organized, it will also be something else, and that will be much more difficult for us to tackle, even if, as you heard, the attacks that may successful in carrying out early likely to be much less lethal. but, a few people killed or wounded, is horrible, and the terrifying effect, the terroristic effect it will have on society and the economy would be significant. thank you very much. [applause] ok, this leaves us plenty of takefor q&a, so i will them in the order that i see you. we'll start right here in the blue shirt, please. i will ping-pong across the room so we get everybody. >> thank you, i am retired u.s. foreign service. i would like to follow up on some of the remarks about what happens in israel.
that is the issue of a possible inspiration of payments to families of prisoners or families who are killed. number one, how much do you do you think, of an inspiration, do those payments account for? number two, what is the likelihood that some governments either in the u.s. or the european union, as suggested by prime minister netanyahu, said they make a linkage between those statements and the reduction of support for the palestinian authority? those types of payments were reduced or caught, what would be the likelihood of the effect of that? is a good think it question. it has been very much in the media lately, because the pa gave out information with regards to its budget. i was looking at the information this week in the context of the study to look at the proportion of the budget and what was
happening in this context. the numbers are almost $200,000 in payments for martyr families. the families of these children, a 9% increase from last year. data withcheck the these names yet, which is something that i would like to do, but it would include paying the families of terrorists even if the terrorists attempted even if they did not succeed. just as a parent of children, and what influences children, i think children want to be able to be relevant. we thinking, culturally, could it influence a child that he knows if he commits a terrorist act that his family then gets paid money as a result of his d, whenact as a shahee that is what he sees i would , imagine that could have a detrimental effect on a child. it's one of the things i was looking in the study. as it relates to youth, most parents know that children do not do well with mixed messages. if educational institutions want
to be consistent, they want to be consistent in the messages they are giving in all different channels. so that means that you would hope the education system would give a message that terrorism is wrong and not say anything that lauds terrorism at all, or praises someone who committed a terrorist attack particular for children because you want to protect children. and you would not want to see payment going to the families. this is a criminal act and criminal acts should be abhorred. there is no positive effect from committing a crime. that would be the kind of messaging that would be consistent with trying to discourage volunteer terrorism. >> right up here in the front? >> hello, i am from the philadelphia inquirer. matt, and anyone else who would like to answer this, there are two things i would like to ask:
is there a worry that individual attackers can develop techniques that would lead to larger numbers of casualties question -- casualties? attack in nice, was one way, and we have seen other attacks that has serious numbers. you can think of drones, or things that an individual could concoct or might see on the internet. that's one thing i wanted to ask. well, let me stop there. >> i want people to be able to go to sleep tonight, so -- the good news is that lone offenders tend not to have great capabilities. for most of the things that are going to lead to larger casualties, you really need at least a little bit of training. explosives, exclusives with chemical precursors, it is not
impossible, and it's not like there are not people who have some training capability. but in general, you will see people who try to make explosives when they are just following directions off the internet as being largely unsuccessful. not always look at the boston , marathon bombing. there are other things that are possible. and again, i'm concerned in this country that you cannot only get a handgun but a fully automatic weapon. you can see in school shootings, scenarios, you can certainly see it in a tourist scenario look at , the weaponry that was found in san bernardino. that could have been worse. the vehicular attack is something of concern. outand others, sent bulletins at the time, and there was a lot of attention being placed once again, years after 9/11, on different ways to protect infrastructure. there is now a concern
especially recently with drones. we have seen the islamic state weaponize drones in the battlefield. one of the concerns we have in general is that when somebody sees something succeeding, they think they can do it too. it's true for the loan offender an offender in general. why might someone be more likely to be mobilized to violence today under certain circumstances than before? they have seen that others have done it and been lauded you to -- whether it is by the islamic state or someone else. people's have seen that the islamic state has been able to weaponize drones in iraq and syria, they might be thinking they can do that here and they can use any kind of drones. there are lots of concerns about these things, and the good news is that enforcement is reanimated on the subject. do you want to jump in on that? boaz: maybe i'm a little bit less optimistic than matt is on the matter.
i would say that we need to understand terrorism as a phenomenon. it's an evolving phenomenon. it's all the time changing and we cannot lay back and say what we know is what there is. on the other side, there are terrorists, and they are always looking for new methods and techniques, different targets and so forth. it's a cat and mouse chase. counter terrorists cannot lay back and say we are fine with that. having this in mind, i would not get into details i would say -- i would not want to induce ideas to these terrorists, but i would say that i believe that this is a growing phenomenon, it is not going to disappear. it's not going to change traditional terrorism. i definitely share with bruce and matt the concern. with organized terrorism and big attacks, even the level of 9/11, we should not exclude that -- on
top of that we are having now the growing phenomenon, that will challenge us in different ways all the time. so, i do believe and hope that there are those people which -- who carry the responsibility to prevent the terrorist attack and they are thinking about what will be the next more effective tactic that the lone wolf might use. i have no doubt in my mind, that those who incites them, we heard from maryland about the incitement as a precursor of that activity those who incite , them and those who would teach them and give them the guidelines would try to be more effective and innovative in their thinking in this regard. >> could? >> yes please. bruce: i would like to be even more pessimistic than boaz. timothy mcveigh. timothy mcveigh was not an archetypal lone wolf. nonetheless, he had no direct organizational connection. he was not carrying that out on behalf of an organization.
the key variable there was that he was able to get the information freely available which, in 1995 was an infantile era, compared to now. the exchange of information now. my emphasis is always on the threat from organization and maybe not another 9/11 but certainly mumbai style or paris style attack. it is worrisome you have now a a mass of people that can access the information more easily than mcveigh could have. you also have a large number of foreign fighters. 40,000 over several countries and not all of them will be killed off despite optimistic hopes they will. some will come back and be part of an organized campaign but some may be the lone wolves of tomorrow they may have the same , military expertise that timothy mcveigh had. then, i would also say that just as boaz described the nature of , terrorism is constantly evolving and changing. never in a good way.
when i started -- when i began my professional career, in 1991, we worked on a study for the american intelligence committee that mapped the attributes of groups june the 1960's and 1970's and the two most common vocations were teachers and medical doctors. teachers was often philosophy professors. so, for those of you who have been at university if you're not , a philosophy professor, you may have a limited technological capability. but think of what is happening today more and more engineers , and scientists are being drawn and of course, there is a jihad" andneers of that proves that there is an alarmingly high proportion of individuals in jihadi groups that have engineering backgrounds. khaled sheikh mohammed, the world trade center attack was an engineer. as more engineers, to terrorism,
it's the potential for more lone wolves. i focus on the organizations again, that there is the potential for lone wolves to be more dangerous and consequential and that's growing. >> the microphone is coming around and your answer makes me think, by the way that we are , focusing largely on the islamic state and al qaeda and islamist inspired but there is - an equally important need to pay attention to the rise of terrorism and potential homegrown terrorism from the left-wing and right-wing, where there tend to be people who have military expertise, the type that could make things more dangerous. >> thank you very much for this terrific presentation. you praise the forrnet as a tool understanding, and from there we can develop counter messaging. as they terrorism researcher, i guess he was support unimpeded access to this content online.
you thought about, to what extent you would support taking this material down? and what set of -- what sort of material, would you say that would be ok to take off the internet? >> thank you, it is a great question. it is always calculating between the ability to monitor over the internet what they do and say, what they plan, and trying to prevent this radicalization process, maybe even communication between them through the internet. you have pros and cons of that, but between you and me, this is a lost war. we cannot prevent them. even if we would have wanted to, we cannot seal the internet, or control the misuse of the internet. eal one nice, they will he, they wille nic
develop another. it's always an effort. i would say what can be done and should be done is to identify those negative and dangerous messages and then used to -- use two tracks. one is the need to develop a new type of big data capability, that will monitor all the discourse over the internet, over the social networks. it can be done and is being done today, but it should be much more sophisticated in order to identify the early stages of radicalization. but alsowith keywords, with sentiment over the internet and much more developed systems , algorithms for that matter, developedneeds to be a doctrine of how to work with this new data. because it was mentioned that even if you know that somebody said that, what do you do with that right now? how do you prevent the attack of
tomorrow morning? there is no longer preparation the guy could save something -- could say something over the internet, and grab a knife there is a lot to do here. can be done, should be done, needed to be done. the other thing which is needed, we see the beginning of it. the corporation of the internet ,ervices, facebook, google telegram, and others need to be more cooperative. today they are more than they used to be. cooperativech more because they bear a lot of responsibility. i would recommend to have laws against them or something. i would definitely beats them in their pockets. inthey do not cooperate preventing and closing those insightful messages i will encourage the victims of
terrorism and the families to sue them for not doing that. >> over here please. me, a failed academic philosopher. you have spoken about the need to monitor the internet to try more sophisticated way who terrorists will be. there has been a lot of discussion about the need to develop effective the internetes on but nobody is really elaborating on where that stands. i wonder if any of the members of the panel if where you think we are not in identifying terrorists but in developing
counter propaganda, counter messaging. whatever terminology you want to use. that -- is that a really effective countermeasure in your judgment? >> i will jump in and say that my co-panelists are absolutely right. this is an area where we would not have a lot of movement and suddenly we do. i would point in particular to google's efforts on youtube people whendirect they do certain searches to certain counter messaging. it is not just the decision to redirect which is a social media platform as a pretty big deal is to make this determination. to what do you redirect them towards? google has done cutting-edge research on what messages work
. sending people to interview people who work captured by isis or people who defected from isis. sending people to work, to interview people who are working in communities in europe. etc.. interviewing mothers. ands pretty tangible work coming up with pretty effective counter messaging tools. right now, you have heard us all say this is nonstatic. it is always changing. , how should we anticipate that the message will change. it how much it will be that the caliphate genie is out of .he bottle how much of it will be relating to the poor acculturation of refugees or the relative
response ability of the west for what is going to continue to happen in syria and maybe even in iraq? thated to think about how message is changing because you cannot assume what happened yesterday is what is going to happen tomorrow. being -- a lotof of work being done. about're talking countermeasures. i would translate that to counter narrative. what needs to be said to counter the narrative of those over the internet and so on and so forth. i believe we are far from understanding the narrative that we will be able to develop a counter narrative. first of all understanding the narrative itself. in my presentation, one way of thinking and i definitely believe in that. we do research and ensure that
-- in israel to do evidence-based information on tha. i believe the honorable thing to do is the narrative. on the flipside of the honorable thing, humiliation. the propaganda of different organizations across the world, the common interest is jihad. starting with al qaeda moving on to isis. , you find inlah most cases of the messages they are sending the concept that that's what you need to because that is the honorable thing to do or you need to revenge mitigation for this or for that. it always has to do with honor and humiliation. thisubs narrative to honorable thing to do. who can do that? bruce?
me? no. the only one who can say are the muslims themselves. we have to make it clear that they are not doing any favors to by conveying the message that this is not the honorable thing to do. this is not what your religion is expecting you to do. there we't come from are all -- i don't want to use the term to describe that. we are all in big trouble. >> wonderful. the start conservative over the university of maryland. his typical for these conversations to adhere to a strictly social political ends -- so she'll political relents -- socialpolitical lens.
idiosyncratic objectives become aligned with terrorist organizations. omar mateen in this case. ononder if you would comment how important you think it is to understand the idiosyncratic dimension and whether there is a role for public health to play when it comes to this counter messaging issues. >> i would like to state that i did not find that question. it's having been asked i will take the opportunity to say yes. a white partisan study in countering extremism. we have done focused specifically on the united states. findingsr bipartisan was that it is important to have a public health file model that will think about this in a much broader way. strong connective
tissue to strong enforcement because there is such a personal psychological piece of this that is driving people. that is not all it is. there is ideology. i have never seen a case in and out of government that was either grievances or ideology. almost every case is going to be some different combination which is why the point is so important. we do like understanding enough. we are beginning to have the understanding that every single case will be different. we can find of the things we will expect to see and we can figure out the portion for each ticker case you because many people including omar mateen are very confused. someone in terms of his islamist orientation described him as al qaeda, hezbollah, not understanding the differences between them. not understanding that they are literally getting each other tooth and nail. that was not the issue.
to him they were the groups that would enable him to do something honorable and remove humiliation. therefore it is critical important to be able to address both. the sociopolitical and the psychological. and the globalal issue and the local grievances as well. any process i would argue here or elsewhere is going to be effective is going to have to be able to address all of those. the public health model, to try to do think that a societal level that will do things to make society strong. when you find a thing that seems susceptible you do extra things there. when you find people who are being affected by the message you go in and you start doing things specifically for that individual who has gotten sick to use the public health. you can find it on our website. i think it is critical important is nowause public health
instead of counterterrorism or instead of law enforcement or intelligence, but it is an tendon. the best example -- tandem. go ask the fbi and others and they will tell you how frustrating it is to have investigated omar mateen in many other cases and having run those investigations to ground. realized there was nothing to hold these people on, nothing to convict them of. strange, obnoxious, even disturbing speech is protected and should be. yet there was no one to hand this person off to. there was no local network for social workers and ecologists to say this clearly has disturbing attributes. then it became a restaurant nothing. -- arrest or nothing. we have a counterterrorism profit -- problem you invite law enforcement. there is not always going to be a law enforcement solution much like there will always be a military solution to these
counterterrorism problems. >> i want to pave the way for bruce to answer the question. first of all, i think your question is very important. the fact that this propaganda is being sent to so many people that only few alluded to the messages is proof that you are right. psychological aspect is true. i'd refer to myself as a student of rousseff therefore i don't want to take any of his time and anybody with this magnificent book would understand how important these are. i will handed over to bruce. >> to quote another of our brian jenkins says if you look in the soul of a person you will find if he is going to be a terrorist or not. that is the main challenge. i don't think there is any profile. it is even more challenging because of social media introducing so many different types.
some are clearly mentally imbalanced and can be spotted but others don't. case.t is definitely the since you are too humble i will take the opportunity to plug in the latest edition of inside terrorism. if he truly wants to understand you will not take it out of the library, you will buy it and read it. >> high, thank you for joining us. joining us. you for i'm interested in the distribution of messaging. as to whether you have any sense of the mechanisms of distribution. you mentioned there were flyers and funerals as well as financial incentives.
findwondering, did you there are certain locations that have different concentrations of each type of encouragement? did you find that there are certain population centers, certain geological features that contribute to where the different types of messaging go? perhaps how many or what type of people they affect? >> an interesting question. i was just taking about that angle of distribution this week because i was looking at the connection of the psychological perspective as it relates to suicide. i was interviewing an expert here in washington and they were explaining -- i was trying to understand what official glorification as to why that tract would be more egregious than other glorification. they were explaining if there was annexed by a suicide in maryland and what they created a whole program, they tried to prevent any kind of official ceremony. in the studies that i was
reading they say that they are trying to do analysis on suicide prevention they talk about spheres of influence. how many circles and how many people get influence. the study has no caps on to that level. the funerals you can see are attended by thousands of thousands. you saw many hits there are the website looking at buyers. we have not reached that level of resolution but it is very clear that the information is widely distributed, the understanding of the youth from an incentive basis. you are a child and go to a funeral with a friend and it is a official funeral, every other honor they can be given. that reaches thousands very clearly. in the process of what can i do with peace, people in the region, you want a culture to educate people on both sides of the conflict of peace. that is an inconsistent message with messaging towards peace.
thank you very much for this investing presentation. my craft and counterterrorism writer. matt's discussion of the psychological aspects remind me of what jessica stern once said. terrorists are trying to reinvent themselves. onike to get your take another aspect of the effort. we talked a little bit about dealing with the internet and counter messaging. i'm wondering your evaluation of the effectiveness. also the effort to reach out to local communities. are trying to reach out to local communities. the british and dutch have had various programs there.
resourceruce mentioned issues. dhs has understanding cut back on their local grants. the state department efforts, the funding efforts on the seventh floor waiting to be approved area do you have any evaluations so far and do you think they will have much cans of success -- chance of success? >> i can say one thing about that. maybe it is a little harsh a position i would say. lot of effort being done over the recent years. led by the obama administration in the united states and with the europeans. i do believe that cbe is important. it is crucial. there is a need to bring the vast majority of the muslims around the world, which do not support those terrorist activists. to bring them to counter the
narrative in an effective measure. it is their job. the problem is that those efforts were very apologetic. coming with a very cautious, and to deal with the problems itself. when you reach out to the muslim communities, the message should be we have nothing against islam or any other religion whatsoever. there is a big problem in islam right now . it represents a minority. i was in with a religious cleric. he said how dear you refer to islam as if it is something to do with terrorism. i said thank you that you shared
those important messages with us. why do you spend your valuable time on us non-muslims? dayshould preach that every to your believers come to your people in sudan, iraq m.r.i. afghanistan. what they do is against the islamic concept and for jihad. in order to defend what you that is thehink message that needed to begin to the muslim communities. states, i the united think it is critically important be as granulars as possible and as community led as possible. the local police who are involved in community policing know their communities best. they are able to work at the most granular, comfortable level with people. working in their community. religiousey are
leaders or librarians or school teachers or what have you. , a title of the study strategy to bring -- build strong communities to protect the u.s. homeland. this is a bipartisan study. with a heavily negotiated title. i think that especially as there is ongoing debate and discussion about how and at what level the federal government should be involved in this space, we have these debates under the obama administration, with concerns about legal issues precluding the federal government from getting involved in these issues to granularity. have debates with the trump administration and how comfortable that is going to be in terms of dealing with types of violent extremism. some excellent
examples in los angeles, a very different model. in boston. minneapolis. other parts of the country. i think that is the last lesson. we should not be looking for one model that will work the same way and all her to the united's eighth but rather state and local authorities should per -- decide what looked best for them -- works best for them. very involved with the state health and human services, that is not a way it is working in los angeles where the mayor's office is working very closely with the local representative of the department of lohan -- department of homeland security. it has to be a model that works for them and when you have that model working you need to have involved religious leaders of what other -- whatever faiths are relevant. those of us on the context of radical islamist extremism, those of us who are not muslims are not credible messengers on
this issue. this will be our last question. >> this was really excellent from all of you. my question is for all of you but particularly in light of what you said. i think it is extremely important that we encourage moderate voices within islam. not only moderate that these are actually reformers within islam. i have gotten to know a lot of them very personally. the thing is that it is
extraordinarily frightening for them. how do we encourage them that they know they are against all of them? >> i have a slightly different think as uneven as the progress is being made we are already facing a new challenge. the state used to say help us build the state now they are saying, and exact revenge. as challenging as it is being to , you'remessage talking about the visceral emotion which is the emotion of revenge and retaliation. i think the challenge that we are going to see is how you frame a message that has more to do with the wretched of the earth. the empowerment of violence.
the fact that violence is good and feels good. how do we come to that message -- counter that message? we have to think differently of how we address a changing message from the terrorist organization. on for a long time but i know everyone is busy. thank you all for taking the time today. thank you very much.
>> up next to rand paul talks about republican options following last week's failed health care bill -- vote. possible changes to the tax code. john kelly is sworn in as white house chief of staff. journal,'s washington live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. the staffrning, attorney for lambda legal and a transgender marine veteran discusses the transgender military band. joshua green will talk about his book on steve bannon and the relationship with president trump. george washington university law professor updates on the investigation of the trump house and russia. be sure to watch washington journal live at 7:00 eastern on tuesday morning.
join the discussion. from rand, remarks paul at the national conservative student conference. he talked about the state of the conservative movement. last week's health care vote and the justice department's use of civil asset forfeiture. rand paul: i have three boys and one of them with me tonight. if you like obamacare you can keep it. [laughter] apparently that is the republican message. if you like it you can keep it. raise your hand if you want to keep obamacare. exactly.